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  1I  Introduction 
 
Labour economics research has long established that education and human capital 
are associated with higher earnings (Sianesi and van Reenen 2003). Evidence also 
indicates that similar levels of education can yield quite diverse earning outcomes 
within narrowly defined occupational classes (Devroye and Freeman 2002; Cawley et 
al.  1998). As a result, recent research has paid attention to the idea of a job-skill 
mismatch (OECD 2001; Wößmann 2003; Gibbons and Waldman 2004). Following 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981), a new literature has emerged that treats undereducation 
and overeducation as phenomena of mismatch between the supply of, and demand for, 
educated workers (Harmon et al. 2003; Sloane et al. 1999).
1  
Undereducation and overeducation are measures of two possible discrepancies 
between actual education attainment levels and the required level of education 
appropriate for particular occupations. For a given task, this required level of 
education can be considered a benchmark; employees with more education than the 
required level are said to be overeducated while those with fewer qualifications are 
seen to be undereducated. Studies have observed that the overeducated earn more than 
their peers with less education, but that the return to extra education is a fraction of 
that associated with required education. In contrast, undereducation carries an 
earnings penalty but this is smaller than the returns to required education.
2 Voon and 
Miller (2005) and Kler (2005) show that the international evidence also holds for 
Australia.  
                                                 
1 Note, a variety of interpretations exist regarding the cause of overeducation. Linsley 
(2005) and Voon and Miller (2005) offer more comprehensive reviews. 
2 See Hartog (2000), Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Büchel and Mertens (2004). 
  2The above studies have coexisted with a substantial literature on training, but there 
has been little interaction between the two fields, despite the fact that training could 
be a response to situations of job-skill mismatch. Economic theory highlights three 
principal motivations for training. The first derives from human capital theory and 
considers training to simply augment human capital. Search and matching theory 
treats training as a supplement to education since its main function is to bridge the gap 
between generic skills and job-specific skills.
3 Although, it can overlap with the first 
two, the third motivation highlights human capital depreciation. Dubin (1972), Rosen 
(1975) and Mincer and Ofek (1982) argue that human capital theory needs to 
explicitly incorporate depreciation. Skill obsolescence has been associated with wear, 
atrophy, as well as technological and organisational change (de Grip 2006; 
MacDonald and Weisbach 2004; Blechinger and Pfeiffer 2000).  
Training can improve the links between existing skills and the skills required for 
the rapid implementation of new technologies (Buchtemann and Soloff 2003) and 
may be an important remedy for skill obsolescence (de Grip 2006; de Grip and van 
Loo 2002).
4 An in-depth study by van Loo et al. (2001) shows that employees’ 
willingness and capacity to participate in training are key mitigating factors 
counteracting human capital depreciation. However, recent research takes care to 
attend to some serious challenges when estimating returns to training. This literature 
shows that the wage effect of training is much lower than previously thought 
(Kuruscu 2006; Schøne 2004). 
This paper re-examines the role of job training in a framework that allows for the 
existence of job-skill mismatch.. We utilise Australian data to assess the direct effect 
                                                 
3 van Smoorenburg and van der Velden (2000) provide more details. 
4 Three decades ago, Liles (1972) also argued the case for training as an important defence 
mechanism against skill obsolescence. 
  3of training on labour income as well as its indirect effect on returns to required 
education, undereducation and overeducation. We consider only training that is 
financed by employers since self-financed training can be undertaken for reasons that 
may be unrelated to labour productivity. We also consider Kuruscu’s (2006) claim 
that existing measures of participation in training may suffer from selection bias. The 
paper is organised as follows. Part II provides a review of the relevant literature and 
the main motivation for this study. Part III outlines our methodology and describes the 
data. Part IV presents the empirical results. Finally, part V concludes. 
 
II  Background 
 
Over the last two decades, extensive empirical research has shown that the 
incidences of undereducation and overeducation are high in European countries, the 
USA and in Australia.
5 The evidence shows that the overeducated receive markedly 
lower returns for additional years of education when compared to workers with the 
same level of education but who are matched to an appropriate job
6. The 
undereducated, on the other hand, receive a wage premium compared to those with 
the same but just the right level of education for the job, although their total earnings 
are usually smaller than those received by co-workers in the same line of occupation 
(Voon and Miller 2005; Kler 2005; Büchel and Mertens 2004; Hartog 2000).    
                                                 
5 See Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000), Dolton and Vignoles (2000), Voon and 
Miller (2005) and Kler (2005). 
6 Theory predicts that overeducation should be a temporary phenomenon as over-qualified 
workers move to other jobs that achieve better job-skill matches. Indeed, the literature points 
to a higher rate of job turnover for the overeducated (Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000) 
but Sloane et al. (1999) and Hartog (2000) observe that the mismatch can persist with the 
overeducated failing to benefit from higher mobility. 
  4The literature on over and undereducation has tended to take either one of two 
directions. The first relates to the measurement of job-skill mismatch. This requires an 
estimate of required education, against which actual education levels can be 
benchmarked. One technique for deriving such an estimate is the objective method, 
involving professional assessments of the minimum years of training required to 
perform key tasks in a particular occupation. Other approaches include the statistical 
method that defines required education as the mean or median of the observed 
distribution of years of education in a particular occupation, and worker self-reported 
estimates of the years of education required to perform their job. The objective 
method seems conceptually superior but it is rarely available on a continuous basis. 
The statistical method rests on the assumption of a symmetry in the distribution of 
required education. Self-reported methods avoid the symmetry assumption but rely on 
subjective assessments (Kler 2005).  
The second direction observed in the literature has attempted to shed light on the 
forces that generate skill mismatch with particular emphasis on the role of new 
technologies. One interpretation is what Voon and Miller (2005) refer to as 
technological change theory that highlights changes in the skill composition of a job 
due to technological change. New graduates are equipped with skills that are better 
aligned with emerging technology but firms are slow to adjust to new technology. As 
result, these new workers are overeducated. Conversely, as firms adapt to new 
technologies, existing workers become undereducated. Principal advocates of 
technological change theory, e.g. de Oliveira et al. (2000), explain this mismatch in 
terms of adjustment costs and assume that the overeducated are well equipped to meet 
the demands of new technology. Thus, the theory can be seen as an alternative to 
human capital theory.  
  5In Australia, the incidences of undereducation and overeducation are closely linked 
to the debate on skill shortage. Kelly and Lewis (2003) attribute this problem to the 
increasing demand for skills that cannot instantaneously be matched by the supply of 
skills. This alternative interpretation pays attention to rapid changes in the demand for 
new skills and alludes to skill obsolescence as a possible driver of skill shortages and 
mismatch. A report prepared by the Department of Education Science and Training 
(2006) provides extensive discussion of the current state of play in the market for 
skills in Australia. An important finding of the report is that there is a shortage of core 
skills that are scarce amongst new graduates. This seems to vindicate earlier claims by 
Groot and Maassen van den Brink (1996) and Sloane et al. (1996) who raise the 
possibility that overeducation could mask a lack of specific job-related skills by 
highly educated workers, rather than being simply the product of an over-supply of 
highly skilled workers in firms that fail to adopt new technologies (the standard 
interpretation of the technological change hypothesis). Their evidence suggests that 
the overeducated actually lack skills which are very important at the workplace. Work 
by Allen and van der Velden (2002) and Chevalier and Lindley (2006) support this 
interpretation. Conversely, the undereducated may have the opportunity to learn new 
skills on the job that compensate for the lack of formal education. These insights point 
to the importance of complementarities between formal education and work-related 
learning as an alternative formulation of the technological change theory.  
Work-related learning directly links to job training and raises the possibility that a 
broader definition of human capital is needed that allows for skill formation beyond 
formal education. This is what is proposed by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). They 
break with the standard view of training as equivalent to schooling and outline a 
theoretical framework under which firms and employees can gain from both general 
  6and job-specific training. They also observe that the productivity gains from on-the-
job training cannot be substituted by formal education given the critical role of 
training in bridging the gap between general-purpose education and job-specific skills. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) emphasise that new technologies make training 
indispensable but labour market imperfections may lead to suboptimal levels of 
workplace training.  
Human capital depreciation integrates the concepts of human capital and 
technological change.
7 The view that human capital is a depletable asset has been 
explicit in the works of Rosen (1975) and Mincer and Ofek (1982). Rosen (1975) paid 
attention to the natural decay of human capital due to ageing, while Mincer and Ofek 
(1982) proposed the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ hypothesis of human capital depreciation by 
observing that workers who had career interruptions experienced a decline in their 
wages. This view of human capital has found application in new models of 
unemployment, such as those proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, 1998). 
The early studies emphasised technical depreciation that related to the deterioration 
of the physical condition of human capital. More recent studies have emphasised 
economic depreciation as an equally important source of depreciation. Here, the focus 
is on the value of human capital that can depreciate as a result of changes in the job or 
work environment (Arrazola et al. 2004). Typical examples are skills, jobs and 
occupation affected by the diffusion of information technology and organisational 
change (MacDonald and Weisbach 2004; de Grip 2006).  
The human capital depreciation literature suggests that skill obsolescence plays a 
role in explaining job-skill mismatch and returns to undereducation and 
overeducation. de Grip and Van Loo (2002) make a direct link between skill 
                                                 
7 The neglect of human capital depreciation is noted by Solow (1999) and Groot (1998). 
  7obsolescence due to non-use and overeducation. They suggest that overeducated 
workers can experience diverse degrees of skill depreciation as a result of ageing, 
career interruptions due to sickness or maternity leave, non-use of skills and 
technological/organisational change. This is also consistent with findings in Allen and 
van der Velden (2002). Gould  et al. (2002) claim that skill obsolescence partly 
explains income dispersion within income groups while Green et al. (1999) find that 
the overeducated tend to have fewer numeracy skills than those whose skills match 
the job requirements.  
According to the above, both the undereducated and the overeducated can be 
affected by technical or economic skill obsolescence. More importantly, what 
emerges from the literature of human capital depreciation is the critical role of 
training as a means of restoring and replenishing human capital. An important finding 
in Mincer and Ofek (1982), for example, is that employees with career interruptions 
managed to restore their human capital through new investment. Moreover, the 
authors note that ‘readaptation (“repair”) of skills is likely to be more efficient than 
new investments in human capital’ (p. 19).  
Ever since Liles (1972), numerous studies have confirmed the value of workplace 
training. We now know that there are substantial returns to training (Ryan and Watson 
2003). We also know that training facilitates the development of human capital and is 
complementary to technological change (Baldwin and Johnson 1995). In the context 
of technological change, skills become obsolete while new skills are slow to integrate 
into the workplace and training can narrow the gap between skills acquired at school 
and skills required at the job (Arulampalam et al. 2004). This confirms a similar 
finding by van Smoorenburg and van der Velden (2000) showing that training 
contributes to the resolution of the job-skill mismatch. Sanders and de Grip (2004) 
  8show that low-skilled workers become more employable after training. Further, the 
literature demonstrates the importance of employee attitudes to training; de Grip and 
van Loo (2002) and van Loo et al. (2001) show that employees’ willingness to 
participate in training can counter human capital depreciation. The empirical evidence 
in Australia also points to significant returns from job training but the estimates vary 
in magnitude.
8  
Note, however, the evidence that has emerged from the above literature attributes a 
return to job training that is often higher than that of education. Schøne (2004) 
considers this to be a major puzzle since the average duration of training is much 
shorter than the time spent on formal education. Goux and Maurin (1997) and 
Kuruscu (2006) also argue that it is plausible that firms select the most productive or 
skilled workers for job training. If participation in training is contaminated by this 
kind of selection bias, existing estimates of returns to job training will be biased. 
Kuruscu (2006) accounts for this bias and shows that previous studies have over-
estimated the value of training. Overwhelmingly, however, current empirical research 
on the value of training fails to correct for firm selection bias (Ryan and Watson 
2003). 
 
III Methodology  
 
We examine three key hypotheses regarding the impact of training on wages and 
whether job training is valuable to workers whose skills do not match with those 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Chapman and Tan (1992) who report returns in the range of 6%-7% 
and Lamb et al. (1998) estimate the return to be 4%. More recent studies place the estimates 
in the range of 7% - 10% (Long 2001).  
  9required at the workplace. The starting point for our analysis is to partition actual 
years of education, SA, into required years of education, SR (i.e., the average of years 
of actual education), years of overeducation, SO, being equal to (SA-SR) if SA > SR and 
zero otherwise, and years of undereducation, SU, being equal to (SR-SA) if SA < SR and 
zero otherwise. In doing so, we follow Voon and Miller (2005) who, in turn, draw on 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and Hartog (2000). Voon and Miller (2005) estimate the 










, , , X E ln    (1) 
where lnWi is the log of average weekly earnings for worker i, SR,i , SO,i , SU,i stand 
for required education, overeducation and undereducation respectively, the fourth 
term is a polynomial of experience, Ej, n is usually set equal to two, Xi is a vector of 
other explanatory variables, α, β, γ, θ, φ are parameters and ηi is a random error term. 
In our analysis, we extend Voon and Miller (2005) to account for training as a 
determinant of wage income. First, we allow for a direct effect where training enters 
as an additional variable in the X vector. That is, we consider the possibility that 
training directly assists workers to augment their human capital. This human capital 
effect  applies equally to all workers. We call this Hypothesis 1. When evaluating this 
hypothesis, our empirical methodology takes account of Kuruscu’s (2006) concern 
that firms may have a preference for skilled workers when they invest in job training. 
The argument goes that firms select skilled workers for training in anticipation of 
relatively greater productivity gains. We overcome this problem by utilising rich 
survey data that allows us to account for this kind of bias and estimate training time 
selected by the worker.   
  10Further, we examine whether training impacts on the return to formal education. 
More precisely, we consider the idea that training can help bridge the gap between 
acquired and required skills. One plausible explanation for this is the job-skill 
matching hypothesis whereby training provides workers with skills that are 
complementary to those acquired through education and without which educational 
knowledge would be under-utilised. Let us call this Hypothesis 2. The third principal 
theory involves human capital depreciation due to technological change. One 
expression of this is the impact of technological change on occupations as a whole. 
Allen and van der Velden (2002) call this ‘occupational’ skill obsolescence that can 
result in an increase or a decrease in the level of required education. Let us summarise 
this effect of human capital depreciation as Hypothesis 3A. It may also be the case that 
some groups, particularly older workers, are more vulnerable to human capital 
obsolescence. We use the term Hypothesis 3B for this possibility.  
By extending Voon and Miller’s (2005) model, we examine the consistency of the 
above hypotheses with Australian labour market data. To do so, we partition 
undereducation into undereducation with participation in current training, SU,T, and 
undereducation without current training, SU,NT. Likewise, overeducation is partitioned 
into overeducation with current training, SO,T, and overeducation without current 
training, SO,NT. We also allow required education to interact with training participation 
since it can shed light on Hypothesis 3A. Equation (2) summarises these three 
decompositions.  
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  11In defining undereducation and overeducation, we adopt the standard of the 
statistical or ‘realised matches’ method, as in Voon and Miller (2005). More precisely, 
required education, SR, is the mean of observed years of education, SA, by occupation.  
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  12Note that TRAIN is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the person 
participated in training and zero otherwise. Thus, this paper extends (1) to consider 
the following model: 
) 4 ( Z ln , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 ε δ γ γ β β α α + + + + + + + + = b T S S S S S S W i NT O T O NT U T U NT R T R
 
The cross-section subscript implied, SR,T, SR,NT, SU,T, SU,NT, SO,T and SO,NT, have 
been defined in (3a) – (3f) above, T is training time (human capital augmenting), Z is 
a vector that consolidates the fourth and fifth terms in (1) and ε is an error term. 
Parameter δ summarises the direct effect of training while α1, β1 and γ1 can capture 
two main indirect effects: skill matching, and skill restoration or replenishment.  
It follows from the above that the data would be consistent with Hypothesis 1 if 
δ>0 in (4). Hypothesis 2 predicts that workers whose skills do not match those 
required ought to earn higher wages when they receive training. Thus, for this 
hypothesis to be valid it would require β1> β2 and/or γ1 > γ2. Provided that required 
education is an accurate measure of job-skill match, model (4) can also be utilised to 
assess Hypothesis 3A by examining whether training leads to wage differentials within 
the group that appears to have just the right level of education. Simply put, if skill 
obsolescence is the cause of shifts in the skill composition of occupations, we should 
observe a training effect at the occupational level as firms adapt to changes in 
technology. Therefore, a finding of α1>α2 would be consistent with Hypothesis 3A. 
Finally, model (4) facilitates a test of Hypothesis 3B by examining whether δi ≠ δj and 
at least one of δi or δj is positive, i and j being two different groups of workers. Note, 
however, the data utilised in this paper, which are described in more detail in the next 
section, are limited to current participation in job training. This constraint would bias 
  13our results downwards if training acts as payment in kind or it takes time to impact on 
wages.
9 In order to compensate for this limitation, we extend analysis of the training-
mismatch nexus to past training by considering the role of experience as a proxy for 




Voon and Miller (2005) and Kler (2005) utilise the ABS (1996) Census of 
Population and Housing Household Sample File (HSF). It provides information on 
the educational attainment and earnings of Australians by gender, age, marital status, 
birthplace, working hours and occupation. The HSF dataset is particularly useful since 
it permits estimation of required education at the two-digit level of occupational 
classification (ASCO2). On the downside, the HSF data do not distinguish between 
labour income and income from other sources. Further, HSF provides estimates of the 
highest educational qualification and not the years spent on education. 
This study utilises the ABS (1997) Survey of Education and Training Unit Record 
File (SET 97) for the following reasons. First, SET 97 provides data on weekly labour 
income. Access to labour income data is crucial for the estimation of returns to 
education. Second, SET 97 offers detailed information on the time individuals have 
spent on education. In contrast to HSF, SET 97 allows for a more accurate measure of 
the number of years Australians have invested on education. We thus exploit 
information on the first and second highest qualification achieved and convert these to 
                                                 
9 Blandy et al. (2000) and Veum (1999) find that this is particularly relevant to young 
workers. Note, however, the counter effect of depreciation of the training effect on wages 
(Blundell et al. 1999). 
  14years of education to arrive at a measure of total years of education, SA.
10 Third, SET 
97 provides extra information on working patterns and history that are vital for the 
estimation of a Mincer-type earnings equation. For instance, the empirical literature 
suggests that job tenure is an important variable (Cardoso 2005). SET 97 allows us to 
incorporate this kind of information as well as information on training. Finally, in 
utilising SET 97, we acknowledge the trade-off between better measures for education 
and labour income, on one hand, and one-digit occupational classifications (ASCO2). 
Thus, the high level of aggregation in the occupation classes has implications for our 
measure of required education. Given the research questions pursued here, however, 
we have little choice but to utilise SET 97. 
SET 97 provides rich information that facilitates detailed examination of the role of 
training in influencing labour market outcomes. The survey records whether an 
individual worker has participated in a training course in 1997 (i.e., if the original 
variable, EXTR, is greater than zero). It also makes possible to distinguish between 
in-house training and external training or between employer-funded external training 
and employee-funded external training. We confine our study to in-house training and 
employer-funded training to account for selection bias in job training and to estimate 
its contribution to labour income. Further, we seek to extend analysis to past training 
by considering the role of experience as a proxy for the stock of training. 
                                                 
10 See the Appendix for more details. 
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IV Results 
 
Table 1 summarises the employment shares of occupational classes, the average 
years of required education, as well as the incidence of required education, 
undereducation and overeducation.
11 Note that highly skilled workers
12 exhibit higher 
levels of required education. Also intuitive is the finding that the incidence of 
undereducation is higher for low skill workers. Yet, managers and administrators, 
professionals are over-represented in the incidence of undereducation and 
overeducation. This seems puzzling but relates to the fact that the distribution of 
education is characterised by fat tails for this occupational class. We suspect this is 
partly due to the 2-digit occupational aggregation in SET 97 and partly due to the fact 
that the standard deviation of education for this occupational group varies widely 
between full-time and part-time employees as well as across industries.
13 In squared 
brackets, columns 3-5 in Table 1 also report the share of full-time workers who had 
undergone training for each respective ASC02 class as well as by skill level. These 
show that the majority of the low skilled did not participate in job training. For 
example, only 27.2% of the low skilled undereducated workers underwent training: 
                                                 
11 Estimates in Tables 1-2 are based on the convention of plus or minus one standard 
deviation from the mean of required years of education as the respective thresholds for 
overeducation and undereducation. Required education is the weighted mean of actual years 
of education using the SET 1997 person cross-section weights to adjust for a sampling bias by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics in favour of persons currently in employment and 
marginally attached to the labour market.
12 We define ‘high skill’ or ‘skilled’ workers as those who report to be in one of the 
following occupations: managers; professionals; associate professionals and tradespersons 
with more years of education than the group average. The residual ASCO2 classes are defined 
as the ‘low skill’ or ‘unskilled’ workers. Persons not in employment with less than 11.5 years 
of education (i.e., the mean for this group) were assigned to the unskilled group while the rest 
were treated as skilled. 
13 Details are available from the authors. 
  16most conspicuous are tradespersons, intermediate production and transport workers, 
and labourers and related workers with only 21.5%, 18.5% and 18.9% having 
participated in training respectively. Conversely, skilled workers exhibit much higher 
rates of training participation: 54.9% of the skilled undereducated and 65.9% of the 
skilled overeducated participated in training. Note also the relatively high share of 
overeducated managers and administrators and professionals who underwent training. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
Table 2 summarises the incidence of required education, undereducation and 
overeducation for various groups of full-time and part-time employees. Here, we see 
that amongst full-time workers, 16.2% of men and 15.1% of women appear to be 
undereducated while 15.5% of men and 10.9% of women are overeducated. With the 
exception of the third figure, our estimates differ from those in Voon and Miller 
(2005) who find that 13.7% of men and 18.5% of women are undereducated and 
13.6% of women are overeducated. The discrepancy may be due to differences in the 
measurement of actual years of education or due to the 2-digit SET 97 aggregation of 
occupational classifications.  
Note, the incidence of both undereducation and overeducation seems to be lower 
amongst the younger workers (i.e., less than 50 years old). We also observe that older 
workers (i.e., 50 and above years old) and those born overseas in a non-English-
speaking country (NESOB) are highly overrepresented amongst the undereducated 
and the overeducated. Similar patterns are observed amongst part-time workers. The 
main difference is that now women have a higher incidence (in percentage terms) of 
undereducation than men.  
  17Table 2 also presents a summary of the proportion of men and women who 
participated in training course in 1997. It shows that among the undereducated 
(overeducated) in full-time employment, 47% (60.6%) of women and 36.6% (51.3%) 
of men participated in training. Also, unskilled, older and NESOB workers exhibit a 
high incidence of no participation in training. For example, of the undereducated in 
full-time employment, only 31.8% of the older workers, 27.2% of low skilled workers 
and 20.8% of NESOB workers participated in training. This compares with the 
42.9%, 54.9% and 42.6% of younger, skilled and Australia-born workers respectively. 
Note that this pattern is even more striking amongst undereducated part-time workers; 
22.5% of the unskilled and 13.2% of NESOB participated in training. Finally, we 
observe that the rates of training of the overeducated are consistently higher than 
those of the undereducated. Some full-time overeducated are even more over-
represented in job training: 60.6% of women, 64% of workers in large firms, and 66% 
of highly skilled workers. 
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
Next, we estimate equation (1) and consider the following Xi variables suggested 
by Voon and Miller (2005): required education (SR); undereducation (SU); 
overeducation (SO); years of experience (E); experience squared and divided by 100 
(E
2); a dummy variable for married persons (MAR); a dummy for males (MALE); a 
dummy for overseas-born workers from English-speaking countries (ESOB); a 
dummy for overseas-born workers from non-English-speaking countries (NESOB); a 
dummy for public sector employment (GOV).  
  18Robust weighted OLS estimates are presented in Table 3. The returns to required 
education are about 10% for men and 11% for women. These are significant but 
substantially lower than the 18% and 15% respective estimates reported by Voon and 
Miller (2005). The coefficient of undereducation is negative while that of 
overeducation is positive. Also, as in previous studies, both coefficients are smaller in 
absolute terms than the coefficients of required education. The fact that the coefficient 
on undereducation is smaller in absolute terms than the coefficient on required 
education implies that the undereducated earn a wage premium relative to those who 
have the same level of education but who are in jobs where that level is required. Note 
that the overeducated pay a wage penalty relative to those who have the same level of 
education and are matched to a job requiring that level of education. Our estimate for 
undereducation is almost identical to that in Voon and Miller (2005) but the estimate 
for overeducation is substantially lower than in Voon and Miller (2005). We attribute 
this difference to the fact that the dependent variable in Voon and Miller (2005) 
includes income other than labour income given the fact that non-labour income 
positively associates with education levels (Campbell 2006). Most other coefficients 
are significant at the 5% confidence level except the ESOB and GOV coefficients for 
men and the MAR and ESOB coefficients for women. For men, the marriage 
premium of 10.1% compares with the 9.2%, 8.9% and 11.1% estimates reported by 
Voon and Miller (2005), Borland et al. (2004) and Breusch and Gray (2004) 
respectively. 
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
  19There are two main issues with the estimates in Table 3. First, they do not account 
for selection bias in the decision to participate in employment. As shown by Heckman 
(1979) and confirmed in an Australian study by Kler (2005), OLS estimates will be 
biased due to misspecification if labour income is observed due to a selection bias in 
the decision to participate in employment. Second, the specification used to derive the 
results in Table 3 does not allow estimation of the returns to training. The latter task, 
however, is not trivial. We first need to consider the possibility that participation in 
training is selection biased if, for example, firms select highly skilled workers for 
training on the premise that these workers are more productive (Kuruscu 2006).  
To take account of these issues, we re-estimate equation (1) and expand the set of 
variables in X to incorporate training. Estimation then proceeds in two steps, where, in 
the first step, we deal with the possibility of firm selection bias in training. This is 
important since existing estimates of returns to training have recently been challenged 
on the basis that the average training course is of relatively short duration (Schøne 
2004). In the second step, we recover estimates of the returns to training time, in the 
context of an environment in which workers are identified according to whether they 
have required education, or instead are characterised by over education or under 
education. 
In the first step we account for firm selection bias in training. The empirical 
literature has neglected this issue and, as a consequence, is silent on the question of 
what estimation procedure is most appropriate in dealing with this issue. One possible 
strategy is the approach adopted by Di Tommaso (1999) who models the joint 
decisions of women’s participation in the labour market and fertility to account for the 
problem of endogeneity and correlation between these two decisions. However, the 
empirical question tackled by Di Tommaso (1999) is very different to the one we face 
  20here. She deals with an individual who takes full responsibility for the two decisions 
that have binary outcomes but are jointly determined. The problem we confront here, 
in sharp contrast, pertains to decisions that are determined independently by two 
different agents. We analyse only employer-provided training and, therefore, it is the 
firm that makes the selection decision for training, while the worker takes the firm’s 
decision as given and determines his or her level of participation in the labour market.  
We exploit SET 1997 information on time spent on training during 1997 in order to 
model weekly hours spent in employer-provided training (TT)
14 by current employees 
and to account for firm selection bias in training. Given that TT is highly skewed, we 
take the log of TT, LTT, as our dependent variable and employ Heckman’s (1979) 
two-step selection model. Skill obsolescence and mismatch create a role for training 
(de Grip et al. 2005). Thus, we conjecture that undereducation (SU) and overeducation 
(SO) are key determinants of training. We also allow for a gender effect on training on 
the basis there might be gender differences with regard to employment status and 
household time allocation. Further, we control for cultural factors that may play a role 
in training participation. Thus, we include MALE and NESOB as indicator variables 
for being a male and born overseas in a non-English-speaking country respectively. 
We consider additional dummy variables for participation in an external training 
course (TX), for participation in a training course that was assessed (TASS); for self-
assessments of the first three main training courses as providing skills that are 
transferable to other employers (TTOE), and for part-time employment (PT). In the 
selection equation, we include variables that are likely to influence employer selection 
in training. We focus on groups of workers that may be perceived by firms to be more 
                                                 
14 In the appendix, there is more detail and summary statistics on the variables used in this 
study. Note, persons not currently employed are excluded in the modelling of training time 
while training that is self-financed by employees is ignored throughout this study. 
  21able to learn and improve their productivity through training. One candidate variable 
is an indicator for having completed more than 12 years of education (HED). Another 
is a dummy variable for the incidence of undereducation (DSU). This follows from the 
maintained hypothesis that training may be particularly useful in cases of skill-job 
mismatch and from existing evidence of a wage premium associated with 
undereducation. Intuitively, firms may have an incentive to select the undereducated 
for training since the evidence suggests that undereducated workers are more 
productive than those with the same level of education that match the level required 
but they also earn less than their co-workers in the same occupation. Also included are 
dummy variables for participation in further education in 1997 (DE), for being at least 
50 years old (AGE50) and for casual work (CAS) as well as GOV, NESOB, MAR.  
The Heckman estimation results appear in column one, Table 4. These show that 
training is indeed not free of selection bias given that both the coefficient estimates 
and the selection regression diagnostics (i.e., ρ,  σ and λ) are highly significant 
statistically. The former suggest that undereducated workers, those undertaking 
further education and public sector employees are all more likely to be selected by the 
firm to participate in training. Conversely, firms seem to be less inclined to pay for 
job training if workers are older, of NESOB background or are on casual employment. 
In the training equation, we note that undereducation, overeducation, males and 
NESOB positively predict hours spent on training. Morever, as expected, training that 
takes place outside the firm, is assessable or offers transferable skills has the greatest 
impact on workers’ time spent on training. Also intuitive is the negative coefficient 
for part-time workers. 
 
- Table 4 about here - 
  22 
The next step utilises the Heckman two-stage predicted scores, TT_N, the 
Heckman selection predictions, TT_S,
15 and actual training time, TT, to arrive at an 
estimate of realised predicted training time, TT_R, that is corrected for firm selection 
bias. Simply put, we account for the fact that the Heckman prediction may not be 
realised since firms may choose to offer less training than what would be predicted on 
the basis of worker characteristics alone; our ultimate goal is to obtain estimates of 
returns to training time that actually occurs and that is selection corrected. To do this, 
we impose the constraint that realised time for any individual, TT_R, should not be 
greater than actual time, TT.  
At the individual level, we identify two main scenarios as most relevant in 
identifying  realised worker selected training, TT_R. These correspond to the 
respective cases in which TT > TT_N and TT < TT_N. In the first scenario, the 
constraint is not binding. Thus, realised training time is set equal to that predicted by 
the model at the second-stage of Heckman estimation; i.e., TT_R = TT_N. In cases 
where TT < TT_N the above constraint is binding. Thus, we account for the selection 
effect and define realised training time to be TT_R = λTT where λ=TT_N/( TT_N+ 
TT_S). Note that TT_R is set equal to zero when the worker did not actually 
participate in employer-financed training. 
Columns 1-2 in Table 5 report the Heckman estimates of equation (4) when the 
realised measure of worker selected training time, TT_R, is used. These estimates 
allow for a selection bias in the choice between participation and non-participation in 
                                                 
15 TT_N and TT_S are the Heckman predictions converted to hours, then standardised and 
subsequently re-centred to have the same sample mean and sample standard deviation as TT. 
  23the labour market.
16 Note we extend Voon and Miller’s (2005) model to include 
tenure (TEN) and tenure squared (TEN
2) divided by 100. The following variables are 
used in the selection equation: a constant, ED9 (a dummy for the attainment of nine 
years of education at most); AGE50 (a dummy for being more than 50 years old); 
NESOB (a dummy for being born O/S in a non-English-speaking country); CARE (a 
dummy for being a carer of elderly and young children); DIS (a dummy for having a 
disability), LONEP (a dummy for being a single parent); KIDS14 (a dummy for the 
presence of kids below 14 years old) and DE (a dummy for further education).  
  
- Table 5 about here - 
 
The returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation are similar to 
those reported in Table 3. Undereducation associates with a wage premium (i.e., the 
difference between the return to required education and the absolute value of the 
return to undereducation) while overeducation results in a wage penalty (i.e., the 
difference between the return to overeducation and the return to required education). 
We note also that the coefficients for E, E
2, TEN, TEN
2, NESOB have the expected 
sign. The results also confirm the importance of a marriage premium for men as in 
Voon and Miller (2005) but here we also find a 3.1% marriage premium for women. 
The latter result contrasts sharply with the -3.5% penalty reported by Chapman et al. 
(2001) but is consistent with a premium of 3.6% in Borland et al. (2004) but much 
lower than the premium of 11.2% reported by Breusch and Gray (2004). Also, public 
sector employment here has a negative sign for men and is insignificant for women. 
                                                 
16 Coverage of the SET was extended to people who were marginally attached to the 
labour market in 1997 and who did not have a wage at the time. This group constitutes 7.5% 
of the sample and facilitates estimation of the Heckman model since the procedure requires 
the modelling of behaviour of Australians who chose not to be employed. 
  24For women, our results indicate that the ESOB and public sector effects observed by 
Voon and Miller (2005) may be due to a sample selection bias.
17 More importantly, 
we find that the coefficients for training time, TT_R, are positive and significant for 
both men and women. They suggest that job training time has substantial returns: 
6.8% for men and 4.7% for women. This gender gap seems consistent with evidence 
in Arulampalam et al. (2004).
18
For comparison with previous studies, we also obtained estimates of returns to 
training participation by when ignoring selection bias. That is, we replaced TT_R with 
the indicator variable TRAIN that takes the value of one if the individual has 
participated in employer-sponsored job training and zero otherwise. The complete set 
of results is not reported due to space consideration but the estimated return to 
training participation was found to be 11.6% for men and 8.5% for women. These are 
very similar to the estimate reported by Booth (1991) for British workers but are 
much higher than the return of 6%-7% in Chapman and Tan (1992) and the 4% 
estimate of Lamb et al. (1998).
19 More recent studies place the estimated returns in 
the range of 7%-10% (Long 2001). Together with the returns to realised training time 
reported in Table 5, these estimates confirm Kuruscu’s (2006) claim that returns to 
training are much lower than previously reported, once we account for firm selection.  
In the selection equation, we observe that having low education adds considerably 
to the probability of participation in the labour market for both men and women. 
Ageing, NESOB background, being a carer, disability and further formal education 
                                                 
17 Voon and Miller (2005) do not account for this possibility while Kler (2005) seems to be 
constrained by HSF data limitations and is, thus, unable to consider key selection variables 
such as training, caring, disability and current participation in education.  
18 Note that our measure of realised training time is uncorrelated with the residuals from 
the wage Heckman equation suggesting that our results are not contaminated by specification 
error. These correlations are reported in the notes to Table 5. 
19 For a more comprehensive summary of the empirical evidence on the effect of training, 
see Ryan and Watson (2003) and Long (2001). 
  25seem to discourage participation. Note also that the presence of young children 
encourages labour market participation for men but has the opposite effect for women.  
The results in Table 5 suggest that training directly impacts on labour income and 
that we cannot reject Hypothesis 1; that is, the human capital hypothesis. Yet, such a 
finding needs to be treated with some caution since this hypothesis can overlap with 
the human capital depreciation hypothesis, Hypothesis 3B. This is because a group of 
workers that are vulnerable to skill obsolescence may cause the coefficient estimate of 
δ to be significant even though δ=0 for many individuals.  
In an attempt to distinguish these two hypotheses, we first examine whether the 
effect of training is similar for workers with varying degree of skills. We draw on 
Harmon  et al.  (2003) who claim that the returns to education may not be 
homogeneous across the income distribution. They utilise quantile regression and find 
that returns increase with quartiles and attribute this to a complementarity between 
ability and education. We seek to employ this estimation procedure to shed light on 
the constancy of the training coefficient. Columns 3-4 in Table 5 present the results of 
inter-quantile regression estimates that test the null of zero difference between the 
coefficients in the 0.75 quartile and those in the 0.25 quartile. The estimates are based 
on simultaneous quantile regressions that jointly estimate the 0.75 and 0.25 quartile 
estimates. The results show that, for men, the return to training increases by 4.6 
percentage points as we move from the lowest quartile to the top quartile in the 
earnings distribution. This substantial increase, however, is not evident amongst 
women. Yet again, compared to women with very low skills, more skilled women 
earn an extra 1.7% if they are undereducated and an extra 2.6% if they are 
overeducated. These results suggest that the data are consistent with the human capital 
depreciation theory, Hypothesis 3B, for full-time male workers in Australia.  
  26We proceed to examine whether training plays any role in cases of skill mismatch. 
More precisely, we seek to estimate model (4) to test whether participation in training 
makes a difference in estimates of returns to required education, overeducation and 
undereducation. The model permits an examination of the three key hypotheses of job 
training: human capital; job search and matching, and human capital depreciation.  
One simple test of the first hypothesis, what we call Hypothesis 1, is to see whether 
the direct training effect observed in Table 5 persists when we control for training 
effects in the event of mismatch, as measured by undereducation or overeducation. If 
it still persists, it would indicate that training augments human capital for all workers 
taking part in training and Hypothesis 1 cannot be dismissed for Australia.  
We thus consider model (4) and again employ the Heckman model using realised 
worker selected training, TT_R, and interact required education, undereducation and 
overeducation with current participation in employer-provided training. Estimation 
results appear in columns 1-2 in Table 6 and confirm those in Table 5 with respect to 
experience, marriage, place of birth, public sector and tenure. In Table 6, however, the 
coefficients of required education and undereducation contrast sharply with those in 
Table 5. We find that training impacts significantly on returns to required education 
and undereducation. Namely, men and women who apparently had just-the-right 
education but did not participate in job training earned less than those who did 
participate. Also in Table 6, Wald test estimates and one-sided tests
20 confirm that 
these differences are statistically significant at 5% confidence level. This important 
finding seems to be consistent with Hypothesis 1 but it also raises the question of 
whether the ‘realised matches’ method used to estimate required education is an 
                                                 
20 That is, one-sided tests of the individual null hypotheses: α1≤ α2, β1≤ β2 and γ1≤ γ2. 
  27adequate measure of skill-job match. Of the undereducated, the wage gap between 
those in training and others also seems significant for men.  
 
- Table 6 about here - 
 
Furthermore, Table 6 shows that the coefficient of TT_R remains positive and 
significant for men, although reduced in magnitude, but has become insignificant for 
women. We interpret the evidence for men to be in favour of Hypothesis 3A and the 
evidence for women to be contradictory to Hypothesis 1 or human capital theory. 
Note also that the evidence in support of Hypothesis 3A hints to the idea that the 
training effect on required education may not be exclusively due to measurement 
problems. 
Analysis of the role of training, so far, has focused on the flow measure of current 
training. Yet, Blandy et al. (2000) and Veum (1999) suggest that training participation 
is often discontinuous and irregular and, more importantly, it takes time to produce 
results. Although SET 97 does not measure the incidence of past training, Table 1 
highlights the fact that the majority of workers participate in job training. By 
extrapolation, we conjecture that worker i has a stock of job training experience, STEi, 
which is a function of past training time, PTTi, the skill depreciation rate, d, and 
current training time, TTi. We also assume that past training experience is an 
increasing function of work experience; that is, ψ(Ei). More formerly,  
 
) 5 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( i i i i i TT E d TT PTT d STE + − = + − = ψ
 
 
  28We seek to apply this concept of a training stock, STE, to gain further insights on 
the value of past training in the presence of skill mismatch. We re-define the indicator 
variable TRAIN in (3a) – (3f) to take the value of one if a worker has at least ten years 
of work experience and zero otherwise. We then repeat the Heckman estimation 
exercise using model (4). The estimation results appear in columns 3-4 in Table 6 and 
show that the wage premium associated with undereducation disappears for both men 
and women who have less than ten years of work experience.
21 Most surprising, 
however, is the effect of work experience on overeducation. Contrary to expectations, 
it is the overeducated with relatively more work experience that pay the highest wage 
penalty. Men and women in this group earn only 2.3% and 2.7% return respectively 
for a year of education in excess of the required level. These estimates contrast 
sharply with the 6.8% - 6.9% return received by the relatively inexperienced 
overeducated. This finding is consistent with the view that some overeducated persons 
may be less able to learn new job skills than others (Chevalier and Lindley 2006; van 
Smoorenburg and van der Velden 2000). On the other hand, the overeducated may be 
more susceptible to the ‘use-it-or-loose-it’ form of human capital depreciation (de 
Grip 2006; de Grip et al. 2005). Nonetheless, the large return associated with 
inexperienced overeducation stands but it is not yet transparent whether this is due to 
‘inexperience’ per se or due to the combined effect of training and inexperience. 
We proceed to further refine the interaction of training and experience with 
mismatch. Again, we re-define TRAIN in order to account for an asymmetric 
experience effect. For required education and undereducation in equations (3a) – (3d), 
TRAIN is set equal to one if the worker has had current training or more than ten 
                                                 
21 More precisely, the wage premiums of 6% (=10.7%-4.7%) and 7.9% (=10.8%-2.9%) 
that undereducated men and women observed in Table 5 turn into a wage penalty of -6.8% 
(=10.7%-17.5%) for men and a minimal premium of 0.4% (=10.7%-10.3%) for women. Note 
also, the one-sided tests of the null of β1≤ β2 are highly significant for both men and women. 
  29years of work experience and equal to zero if otherwise. In the case of overeducated 
workers in equations (3e) - (3f), TRAIN is  equal to one if the worker has had current 
training and less than ten years of work experience and equal to zero if otherwise. We 
impose this asymmetry in light of the evidence in columns 3-4 in Table 6 and in order 
to more precisely test whether that result is purely due to an ‘inexperience’ effect or 
due to the training of the inexperienced overeducated. Columns 1-2 in Table 7 present 
the estimation results. Here, the combined effect of current and past training on 
undereducation is higher than the effect of current training in columns 1-2 of Table 
but similar to that of the stock of training (i.e., work experience) in columns 3-4 of 
Table 6. Further, the combined effect of current and past training on overeducation 
(row six, Table 7) is now higher than the effect of current training or work 
inexperience (row seven, Table 6. This confirms the view by Chevalier and Lindley 
(2006) who caution against the treatment of the overeducated as a homogeneous 
group. They distinguish between the ‘apparent’ overeducated who are able to benefit 
from job training and the ‘genuine’ overeducated who are trapped in low-skill jobs 
that do not require training. Further, the results here allude to an important ‘youth-
training’ effect in overeducation and suggest that the work inexperience effect in 
Table 6 is mainly driven by considerable learning by the young overeducated 
facilitated by job training. We consider this to be consistent with the proposition that 
the stock of training ameliorates the effect of skill mismatch for the undereducated 
and the young overeducated.
22  
 
- Table 7 about here - 
                                                 
22 For completeness, we also investigated whether a ‘young-training’ effect is present in 
undereducation by re-defining TRAIN to be consistent with the treatment of overeducation. 
We did not find such an effect to be statistically significant. 
  30 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates of TT_R in Table 7 show that both men and 
women boost their labour income by 5.3% and 3% respectively when they participate 
in job training. This result is supportive of Hypothesis 1 (i.e., human capital theory) 
but it cannot exclude Hypothesis 3B (i.e., skill obsolescence). 
Overall, the evidence so far is broadly consistent with all the three main hypotheses 
of training since: (a) the coefficient estimates of TT_R were positive and significant 
(Hypothesis 1);
23 (b) training appears to be valuable in bridging the gap between 
acquired and required skills (Hypothesis 2); (c) training made a difference amongst 
workers with the just-right education (Hypothesis 3A), and (d) the direct effect of 
training captured by the TT_R coefficient was found to be 2.3% – 4.6% higher for the 
highly skilled, columns 3-4 in Table 5 (Hypothesis 3B). Obviously, finding (d) casts 
some doubt on the validity of Hypothesis 1. 
In order to illuminate further on the importance of the three principal hypotheses in 
Australia, we finally partition the gender samples further on the basis of age and re-
estimate (4). We distinguish between young workers (i.e., 15-35 years old) and 
mature workers (i.e., 36-65 years old). This partition of the samples is based on two 
key insights in the human capital depreciation literature: (a) age is a major factor that 
is traditionally associated with skill obsolescence, and (b) lack of training can 
accelerate the depletion of human capital
24.  
In columns 3-4 of Table 7 are Heckman estimates of (4) for young workers where 
we employ the same definition of TRAIN as in the last set of regressions, see columns 
1-2, Table 7. The results are striking. First, the wage premium received by the 
                                                 
23 The estimate for women in Table 5 was an exception but could be due to the current 
training being a weak proxy for the stock of training experience. 
24 See, for instance, de Grip (2006) and de Grip and van Loo (2002). Richardson (2004) 
also makes the link between skill obsolescence and age. 
  31undereducated remains for those with current training or more than ten years of work 
experience but almost vanishes for women and even becomes a huge wage penalty for 
men. Second, the wage penalty associated with overeducation disappears for young 
men and shrinks to -1.8% (i.e., 10% minus 11.8%) for young women who participate 
in job training and have less than ten years of work experience. However, the rest of 
the overeducated young workers still experience the wage penalty observed 
previously. Third, the marriage premium and the NESOB effect reported in earlier 
tables also become insignificant for both genders. Fourth, the coefficient estimate of 
TT_R is no more significant for women at 10% confidence level.
25  
Last but not least important are the estimation results presented in columns 5-6 of 
Table7. These pertain to the mature group of workers aged 36 years and above.
26 The 
results can be summarised as follows: (a) training has no impact on returns to required 
education, (b) current or past training increases the wage premium in undereducation 
to a record high so far (i.e., a minimum absolute value of 1.2% and 1.8% for men and 
women); (c) lack of training experience, on the other hand, has little effect on the 
wage premium of the undereducated; (d) job training is also of little value to mature 
overeducated workers for whom the wage penalty remains considerable
27, and (e) the 
direct effect of current training time is again around 6% for both men and women.  
In the context of strong interaction effects between training and mismatch in 
columns 1-4 of Table 7, we interpret findings (b)-(d) above to indicate clear support 
for Hypothesis 2. Figure 1 more succinctly illustrates the point. It makes it obvious 
                                                 
25 Due to space limitations, estimates in Table 7 are reported at two decimal points. As a 
result of rounding, the level of statistical significance is not always obvious but detailed 
estimates are available upon request. 
26 TRAIN is again defined on the basis of an asymmetric experience effect but due to a 
shift in the average level of experience and sample limitations, we use twenty-five and fifteen 
years of experience as the thresholds for required education and undereducation, and 
overeducation respectively.  
27 In Table 7, one-sided tests of coefficient estimates confirm results (a) to (d). 
  32that job training boosts labour income substantially. However, the grains from job 
training seem greater for young workers and the undereducated.  
 
-  Figure 1 about here - 
 
However, Hypothesis 2 may overlap with Hypothesis 3 if preliminary evidence by 
de Grip et al. (2005) is confirmed in future research. They find that workers who are 
themselves in job mismatch exhibit much higher rates of ‘cognitive decline’ (i.e., 
human capital depreciation). Further, jointly considered, findings (c)-(e) are consistent 
with  Hypothesis 3B since the coefficient estimates of TT_R (i.e., human capital 
augmenting effect) were observed earlier to be either smaller in size than that of 
mature workers or were statistically insignificant. Also, the persistence of a wage 
premium in undereducation and a wage penalty in overeducation are seen as further 
evidence in favour of human capital depreciation theory (i.e., Hypothesis 3B). 
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the idea that training is used to bridge the 
gap between acquired skills or formal education and required skills at the workplace. 
It also supports the view that a lack of job training is central to explaining the wage 
penalty associated with overeducation. A similar effect is observed for the 
undereducated; those who receive training seem to recover the income loss due to 
undereducation. Thus, the results suggest that standard measures of undereducation 
and overeducation mask substantial differences within the undereducated and 
overeducated. Moreover, they indicate that training mainly helps to alleviate the skill-
job mismatch. Finally, the evidence strongly suggests that training acts as a catalyst in 
the restoration and replenishment of human capital, especially for older workers. 
 
  33V  Conclusion 
 
The role of training in affecting labour market outcomes is a relatively under 
researched area in labour economics. This is especially true when compared to the 
extensive body of research analysing the impact of formal education. 
We show that training has a significant impact on the wage experiences of workers, 
with wage premia around 7% and 5% for men and women respectively. Job training 
also has important effects when there is a mismatch between the formal educational 
requirements for particular occupations and the realised formal educational 
attainments of workers. In particular we show that the disadvantage of deficient levels 
of formal education can be ameliorated through subsequent training. Even for those 
who are overeducated, there appears to be a wage benefit from further training. 
Indeed, we find evidence that workers who fail to appreciate the potential gains from 
training are at a serious disadvantage. This is especially true of the undereducated and 
young workers.  
We also sought to evaluate the relevance of three economic theories that postulate 
a role for job training. Thus, we have examined the importance of training for all 
workers and paid particular attention to the benefits of job training for the unskilled 
and matured aged workers. Overall, the evidence seems most consistent with 
matching theory and with the human capital depreciation hypothesis.  
There is scope for a great deal of further research in this area. Of prime importance 
would be to extend the analysis to include dynamic effects of training. Is it the case, 
for example, that the wage benefits to training dissipate over time? Is past experience 
in training the actual cause of the disappearing wage penalty for the overeducated? 
Answers to these questions await the availability of dynamic, longitudinal data.   
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  39Appendix: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics* 
Label  Type  Definition  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
AGE50 D  Age  ≥ 50 years  0.16    0   1
CARE  D   Carer for the elderly/kids.  0.07    0   1
CAS  D  Casual employment.  0.21    0   1
DE  D  Participation in further education 
utilising data on ‘Full-time or part-
time study status for qualification 
enrolled for in 1997’ (CSFTPT). 
0.10    0   1
DIS  D  Disabled.  0.19    0   1
DSU D  Undereducated.  0.37    0   1
ED9  D  Education of ≤ 9 years.  0.15    0   1
ESOB  D  Overseas-born in an English speaking 
country. 
0.10    0   1
E  C  Years of experience.  21.4 12.63   1  54
E
2 C  E squared/100.  6.18  6.20   0  29
GOV  D  Public sector employment.  0.17    0   1
HED  D  Education of ≥ 12 years.  0.48    0   1
KIDS14  D  Children aged 14 years old, at most.  0.34    0   1
LONEP  D  Single parent.  0.04    0   1
MALE  D  Male.  0.54    0   1
MAR  D  Married.  0.59    0   1
NESOB  D  Overseas-born in a non-English 
speaking country. 
0.15    0   1
PT  D  Part-time employment.  0.24    0   1
SA C  Actual years of education.   12.10 2.70    6  21
 S A is the sum of S1A and S2A where the latter stand for years of education for the 
first and the second highest qualification respectively (H1LEVEL and H2LEVEL 
in SET 97). S1A was on the basis of ‘H1LEVEL’ and ‘AGELEF’ (i.e., age left 
school). We assigned 19 years of education to higher degrees, 17 to post-graduate 
diplomas, 16 to Bachelor degrees, 14 to skilled vocational training, 13 to under-
graduate diplomas, 12.5 to basic vocational training or associate diplomas, 12 to 
secondary school, not stated or less than a semester’s course, 11 if left school at 
age 17 year or over, 10 if left school at the age of 16 or still at secondary school, 9 
if left at 15, 8 if left at 14, 7 if left school at 13 or under, and 6 if the person never 
attended secondary school. S2A took the value of 2 when the second qualification 
was a higher degree or a skilled vocational course, 1 if postgraduate diploma or 
undergraduate diploma and 0.5 if associate diploma or basic vocational course. 
SO C  Overeducation: equals (SA-SR) if SA>SR 
and zero if otherwise. 
0.89 1.34   0  10
SO, T C  Overeducation with training: equals SO 
if TRAIN=1 and zero if otherwise. 
0.37 0.99   0  10
SO, NT C  Overeducation without training: equals 
SO if TRAIN=0 and zero if otherwise. 
0.38 0.96   0   9
  40SR C  The weighted mean of SA by occupation 
‘in job with main period employer’ 
(ASCO2) using the SET 1997 person 
weights to adjust for a sampling bias by 
the ABS in favour of persons currently 
in employment and marginally attached 
to the labour market.
12.3 1.56 10 15
SR, T C  Undereducation with training: equals SR 
if TRAIN=1 and zero if otherwise. 
4.53 6.19   0   15
SR, NT C  Undereducation without training: equals 
SR if TRAIN=0 and zero if otherwise. 
6.09 6.01    0   15
SU C  Undereducation: equals (SR-SA) if 
SA<SR and zero if otherwise. 
0.66 1.16   0    9
SU, T C  Undereducation with training: equals SU 
if TRAIN=1 and zero if otherwise. 
0.27 0.81   0   8
SU, NT C  Undereducation with training: equals SU 
if TRAIN=1 and zero if otherwise. 
0.39 0.96   0   9
TEN  C  Tenure: years of employment in the 
current ‘main’ employer. 
6.09 6.76   0  25
TEN
2 C  Tenure squared/100  0.83 1.59    1   6  
TASS  D  Participation in a training course that 
was assessed. 
0.15     0   1
TT  C  Hours spent on training by current 
employees (TIMECRS) divided by 
forty eight weeks. Training that is self-
financed by employees was ignored. 
1.04 2.15   0  21
TT_N  C  Heckman prediction of worker selected 
hours spent on firm-sponsored training. 
0.96   1.39   0   16
TT_S  C  Heckman prediction of firm selected 
hours spent on firm-sponsored training. 
0.86 1.01    0    8
TT_R  C  Realised weekly hours spent on 
employer-provided training.  
0.15 0.38   0   7
TTOE  D  Self-reported assessment that the first 
three main training courses attended 
provided skills that are transferable to 
other employers. 
0.09      0   1
TRAIN  D  Participation in employer-financed 
training.  
0.38    0   1
TX  D  Participation in an external training 
course financed by the employer. 
0.49      0   1
W  C  Weekly earnings: ‘usual weekly 
earnings in job with main period 
employer’ (EARNMPE). 
529 304 60  1180
* D=Indicator variable (=1 if condition applies); C=Continuous variable, SD=Standard 
deviation, MIN=Minimum value; MAX=Maximum value.  
Note: The mean value for indicator variables stands for the share of those workers that meet 
the particular condition. The mean and standard deviations estimates are weighted by the 
person weights provided in SET 97. 
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Table 1. Incidence of Undereducation, Overeducation and Training by 













































































































































































Managers and administrators  6.4  13.9  51.0 [60.1]  26.2 [53.8]  22.8 [74.8] 
Professionals   18.9  15.2  68.0 [70.6]  17.6 [60.9]  14.4 [69.8] 
Associate professionals  11.1  12.5  66.8 [57.6]  18.4 [48.1]  14.8 [61.8] 
Tradespersons  15.8  12.5  74.3 [37.9]  20.6 [21.5]   5.1 [44.2] 
Advanced clerical and service workers  3.70  11.9  85.8 [48.6]   7.9 [41.3]   6.3 [70.5] 
Inter. clerical, sales & service workers  17.0  11.7  71.3 [51.6]  13.2 [43.8]  15.5 [53.4] 
Inter. production & transport workers  11.4  10.9  69.6 [29.7]  12.9 [18.5]  17.5 [39.2] 
Elem. clerical, sales & service workers 6.19  11.0  79.2 [36.9]   5.1 [39.3]  15.7 [37.9] 
Labourers & related workers  9.60  10.5  72.2 [22.6]  12.6 [18.9]  15.1 [27.9] 
Low skill workers  49.7  11.3  71.8 [36.8]  17.1 [27.2]  11.8 [42.0] 
High skill workers  50.3  13.6  68.7 [57.3]  14.6 [54.9]  13.4 [65.9] 
All full-time workers    12.5  70.2 [47.3]  15.8 [40.0]  13.9 [53.8] 
Note: Percentages may not sum up to 100 due to rounding. Required education is the weighted 
mean of actual education by occupational class using the SET 1997 cross-section weights. The high 
skill group comprises of the first four ASCO2 classes excluding tradespersons whose years of 
education are below the group average. Here, it excludes persons not in employment. Only 
employer-provided training is considered. 
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Table 2. Incidence of Undereducation, Overeducation and Training: Australia, 1997 













 Full-Time  Employees 
Gender: Women   73.9  51.0  15.1 47.0 10.9 60.6 
Gender: Men   68.3  45.2  16.2 36.6 15.5 51.3 
Young: Below 50  72.8  47.9  13.8 42.9 13.4 54.8 
Old: 50 plus  56.3  43.3  26.8 31.8 16.9 49.5 
Firm Size: Small  70.7  32.3  17.7 26.1 11.5 36.8 
Firm Size: Large  69.9  59.9  14.3 54.3 15.9 64.0 
Skill Level: Low  68.7  36.8  17.1 27.2 14.2 42.0 
Skill Level: High  71.8  57.3  14.6 54.9 13.6 65.9 
Birthplace: NESOB  66.2  36.0  16.2 20.8 17.6 43.4 
Birthplace: AUS  71.3  49.2  15.9 42.6 12.8 56.8 
  Part-Time Employees 
Gender: Women   78.0 30.7 12.7  27.9 9.4 43.5 
Gender: Men   76.3  20.7  11.3 21.1 12.4 26.5 
Young: Below 50  80.5  28.1   9.6  27.7   9.8  37.7 
Old: 50 plus  57.7  27.9  29.9 23.2 12.4 40.3 
Firm Size: Small  74.7  20.0  14.9 19.9 10.3 28.6 
Firm Size: Large  81.3  38.2   8.8  40.9   9.9  51.6 
Skill Level: Low  79.3  22.9  10.6 22.5 10.1 33.5 
Skill Level: High  72.4  44.8  17.2 33.2 10.4 51.0 
Birthplace: NESOB  66.7  20.7  13.8 13.2 19.5 27.2 
Birthplace: AUS  79.6 28.6 11.9  28.2 8.5 39.5 
Note: Percentages may not sum up to 100 due to rounding. Only employer-provided training is considered.  
Source: ABS 1997 Survey of Education and Training. 
 
 
  43Table 3. Returns to Education by Full-time Workers in Australia, 1997:  
The Voon and Miller (2005) Model 
  Robust weighted OLS 
  Men Women 
Constant   4.610 (0.042)   4.517 (0.047) 
Required Education (SR)   0.105 (0.003)   0.111 (0.003) 
Undereducation (SU)  -0.033 (0.004)  -0.029 (0.005) 
Overeducation (SO)   0.033 (0.004)   0.038 (0.005) 
Experience (E)   0.040 (0.002)   0.034 (0.002) 
EXP squared/100 (E
2)  -0.063 (0.003)  -0.058 (0.004) 
Married (MAR)   0.101 (0.011)   0.017 (0.010) 
O/S Born, ESOB   0.015 (0.015)   0.008 (0.016) 
O/S Born, NESOB  -0.094 (0.013)  -0.038 (0.014) 
Public Sector (GOV)   0.007 (0.010)   0.036 (0.012) 
Observations  6840 3925 
R
2 (overall)  0.35 0.39 
Standard-errors in parentheses. 
Source: ABS 1997 Education and Training Unit Record File. 
 
 
Table 4. Modelling Training Time in Australia, 1997: Heckman Selection  
Explanatory Variables    Selection Variables 
Constant  -1.225 (0.041)  Constant  -0.423 (0.028) 
Undereducation (SU)   0.050 (0.012)  Higher Education (HED)   0.488 (0.025) 
Overeducation (SO)   0.028 (0.010)  Undereducated (DSU)   0.143 (0.025) 
Male (MALE)   0.145 (0.028)  Further Education (DE)   0.353 (0.031) 
O/S Born, NESOB   0.197 (0.047)  Public Sector (GOV)   0.587 (0.017) 
External Training (TX)   0.479 (0.026)  O/S Born, NESOB  -0.401 (0.026) 
Training Assessed (TASS)   0.649 (0.028)  Married (MAR)   0.123 (0.018) 
Skills Transferable (TTOE)   0.530 (0.027)  Over 50yrs old (AGE50)  -0.228 (0.023) 
Part-time Worker (PT)  -0.231 (0.035)  Casual Worker (CAS)  -0.598 (0.028) 
Observations  16810   
Rho (ρ)  -0.278 (0.031)     
Sigma (σ)   1.097 (0.012)     
Lambda (λ)  -0.306 (0.036)    
Standard-errors in parentheses.  
Source: ABS 1997 Education and Training Unit Record File. 
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Table 5. Returns to Education and Training by Full-time Workers in Australia, 
1997: A Two-stage Heckman Selection Model 
  Training Time  Inter-Quantile Regressions 
  Men Women Men Women 
Constant   4.844 (0.043)   4.761 (0.050)   0.528 (0.055)   0.279 (0.057) 
Required Education (SR)   0.107 (0.003)   0.108 (0.003)  -0.008 (0.004)   0.002 (0.004) 
Undereducation (SU)  -0.047 (0.004)  -0.029 (0.005)   0.011 (0.006)   0.017 (0.006) 
Overeducation (SO)   0.033 (0.004)   0.038 (0.004)  -0.001 (0.005)   0.026 (0.006) 
Experience (E)   0.032 (0.002)   0.030 (0.002)   0.001 (0.002)   0.001 (0.003) 
EXP squared/100 (E
2)  -0.051 (0.003)  -0.054 (0.004)  -0.001 (0.005)   0.003 (0.005) 
Married (MAR)   0.057 (0.011)   0.031 (0.010)  -0.016 (0.017)  -0.025 (0.013) 
O/S Born, ESOB   0.027 (0.014)   0.014 (0.015)   0.003 (0.017)   0.019 (0.019) 
O/S Born, NESOB  -0.048 (0.013)  -0.039 (0.015)  -0.029 (0.020)   0.017 (0.019) 
Public Sector (GOV)  -0.029 (0.010)  -0.020 (0.011)  -0.066 (0.013) -0.046  (0.014) 
Tenure (TEN)   0.014 (0.002)   0.023 (0.002)  -0.009 (0.003)  -0.009 (0.003) 
TEN squared/100 (TEN
2)  -0.033 (0.008)  -0.074 (0.011)   0.024 (0.010)   0.025 (0.013) 
Training Time (TT_R)   0.068 (0.010)   0.047 (0.014)   0.046 (0.015)   0.023 (0.019) 
 Selection  Equation   
Constant   0.252 (0.012)  -0.058 (0.019)     
Low Education (ED9)   0.606 (0.029)   0.090 (0.031)     
Over 50yrs old (AGE50)  -0.089 (0.023)  -0.212 (0.033)     
O/S Born, NESOB  -0.223 (0.024)   0.038 (0.031)     
Carer (CARE)  -0.159 (0.073)  -0.553 (0.050)     
Disable (DIS)  -0.110 (0.022)  -0.110 (0.030)     
Lone Parent (LONEP)  -0.279 (0.084)   0.099 (0.045)     
Kids below 14 (KIDS14)   0.230 (0.020)  -0.338 (0.029)     
Further Education (DE)  -0.399 (0.038)  -0.497 (0.048)     
Observations  11826 10878  6840  3925 
Rho (ρ)   -0.811 (0.023)  -0.759 (0.041)     
Sigma (σ)   0.418 (0.012)   0.360 (0.017)     
Lambda (λ)  -0.339 (0.019)  -0.273 (0.027)     
Corr(TT_R, W_RES)  -0.015 [0.19]  -0.029 [0.07]     
0.75 Pseudo R
2    0.22  0.29 
0.25 Pseudo R
2    0.24  0.27 
Standard-errors in parentheses. TT_R is the realised predicted value of weekly hours on training from 
Table 4. When training participation, TRAIN, is used instead of TT_R, we obtain similar results 
except that the coefficient for TRAIN is 0.117 and 0.88 for men and women respectively, and both are 
statistically significant at 5% confidence level. Inter-quantile regression results are post-simultaneous 
quantile estimates using 500 bootstrap replications. Corr(TT_R, W_RES) is the pairwise correlation 
coefficient, p-values are in square brackets based on Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels, and 
W_RES is the residual of the corresponding wage equation. Note, regression estimates of W_RES 
against TT_R and a constant did not produce a statistically significant coefficient for TT_R (results are 
available from the authors). 
Source: ABS 1997 Education and Training Unit Record File. 
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Table 6. Skill Mismatch and Training by Full-time Workers in Australia, 1997: 
Heckman Selection Model 
 Current  training  participation  Experience (10 years +) 
  Men Women Men Women 
Constant   4.926 (0.043)   4.822 (0.051)    4.918 (0.046)   4.817 (0.054) 
Required Education    
- with Training (SR,T)   0.107 (0.003)   0.107 (0.003)   0.109 (0.003)   0.111 (0.003) 
- without Training (SR,NT)   0.099 (0.003)   0.102 (0.003)   0.104 (0.003)   0.105 (0.003) 
Undereducation    
- with Training (SU,T)  -0.035 (0.006)  -0.023 (0.007)  -0.036 (0.004) -0.027  (0.005) 
- without Training (SU,NT)  -0.050 (0.005)  -0.034 (0.007)  -0.175 (0.014) -0.103  (0.018) 
Overeducation   
- with Training (SO,T)   0.028 (0.005)   0.043 (0.006)   0.023 (0.004)   0.027 (0.005) 
- without Training (SO,NT)   0.039 (0.005)   0.031 (0.006)   0.069 (0.010)   0.062 (0.008) 
Experience (E)   0.031 (0.002)   0.030 (0.002)   0.026 (0.002)   0.024 (0.003) 
EXP squared/100 (E
2)  -0.049 (0.003)  -0.053 (0.004)  -0.042 (0.004) -0.045  (0.005) 
Married (MAR)   0.053 (0.010)   0.031 (0.010)   0.042 (0.011)   0.023 (0.005) 
O/S Born, ESOB   0.030 (0.014)   0.015 (0.015)   0.026 (0.013)   0.015 (0.015) 
O/S Born, NESOB  -0.036 (0.013)  -0.027 (0.015)  -0.049 (0.013) -0.036  (0.015) 
Public Sector (GOV)  -0.045 (0.010)   0.008 (0.011)  -0.032 (0.010)   0.008 (0.011) 
Tenure (TEN)   0.012 (0.002)   0.022 (0.003)   0.012 (0.002)   0.022 (0.002) 
TEN squared/100 (TEN
2)  -0.027 (0.008)  -0.069 (0.011)  -0.027 (0.008) -0.070  (0.011) 
Training Time (TT_R)   0.023 (0.011)   0.010 (0.014)   0.068 (0.010)   0.049 (0.013) 
Observations (n)  16810 16810 16810 16810 
Rho (ρ)   -0.807 (0.024)  -0.748 (0.045)  -0.800 (0.027) -0.741  (0.046) 
Sigma (σ)   0.413 (0.012)   0.354 (0.017)   0.405 (0.013)   0.351 (0.017) 
Lambda (λ)  -0.334 (0.019)  -0.265 (0.029)  -0.324 (0.021) -0.260  (0.029) 
WSR,T=SR,NT  [H0: α1 ≤ α2]  45.14 [0.000]  12.92 [0.000]   9.04 [0.001]  10.36 [0.000] 
WSU,T=SU,NT  [H0: β1 ≤ β2]   3.83 [0.025]   1.69 [0.097]  89.96 [0.000]  16.68 [0.000] 
WSO,T=SO,NT  [H0: γ1 ≤ γ2]   2.29 [0.935]   1.75 [0.093]  18.59 [0.999]  12.63 [0.999] 
Standard-errors in parentheses. Estimation results for the selection equation are not reported but are 
available upon request. In the last three rows, the Wald statistic is distributed as F(r, n-r) where n is 
the number of observations and r is the number of restrictions; here it is F(1, 16809). P-values of one-
sided tests of coefficients in square brackets. 
Source: ABS 1997 Education and Training Unit Record File. 
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Table 7. Job-Skill Mismatch and Training by Full-time Workers, 1997: 
Asymmetric Experience Effects 
 All  ages Young Mature 
  Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Constant   4.890 (0.04)   4.80 (0.00)   4.300 (0.09)   4.156 (0.08)   5.112 (0.12)   5.388 (0.16) 
SR,T  0.108 (0.00)   0.108 (0.00)   0.111 (0.00)   0.118 (0.00)   0.099 (0.00)   0.102 (0.00) 
SR,NT  0.107 (0.00)   0.102 (0.01)  0.117 (0.00)   0.120 (0.00)   0.098 (0.00)   0.102 (0.01) 
SU,T -0.037 (0.00)  -0.027 (0.01)  -0.058 (0.01)  -0.054 (0.01)  -0.012 (0.01)  -0.018 (0.01) 
SU,NT -0.189 (0.02)  -0.099 (0.02)  -0.180 (0.01)  -0.110 (0.02)  -0.044 (0.03)  -0.051 (0.02) 
SO,T  0.074 (0.01)   0.071 (0.01)   0.114 (0.01)   0.100 (0.01)   0.023 (0.01)   0.027 (0.01) 
SO,NT  0.027 (0.00)   0.032 (0.00)   0.043 (0.01)   0.028 (0.01)   0.015 (0.00)   0.029 (0.01) 
E   0.030 (0.00)   0.028 (0.00)   0.100 (0.01)   0.093 (0.01)   0.010 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01) 
E
2 -0.048 (0.00)  -0.052 (0.00)  -0.271 (0.03)  -0.261 (0.03)  -0.021 (0.01)  -0.006 (0.01) 
MAR   0.047 (0.01)   0.022 (0.01)   0.010 (0.01)   0.016 (0.01)   0.081 (0.02)  -0.004 (0.01) 
ESOB   0.026 (0.01)   0.015 (0.01)   0.052 (0.02)   0.041 (0.02)   0.018 (0.02)  -0.004 (0.02) 
NESOB  -0.049 (0.01)  -0.035 (0.01)  -0.007 (0.03)  -0.040 (0.02)  -0.088 (0.01)  -0.051 (0.02) 
GOV  -0.035 (0.01)  -0.017 (0.01)  -0.013 (0.02)   0.018 (0.01)  -0.031 (0.01)   0.023 (0.01) 
TEN   0.013 (0.00)   0.023 (0.00)   0.022 (0.00)   0.031 (0.00)   0.011 (0.00)   0.016 (0.00) 
TEN
2 -0.029 (0.01)  -0.071 (0.01)  -0.096 (0.03)  -0.135 (0.03)  -0.018 (0.00)  -0.046 (0.01) 
TT_R   0.053 (0.01)   0.030 (0.01)   0.040 (0.02)   0.018 (0.02)   0.064 (0.01)   0.060 (0.02) 
n  16810  16810  8159 8159 8651 8651 
ρ  -0.802 (0.02)  -0.746 (0.04)  -0.647 (0.08)  -0.573 (0.18)  -0.021 (0.15)  -0.820 (0.03) 
σ   0.407 (0.01)   0.352 (0.02)   0.377 (0.02)   0.290 (0.03)   0.319 (0.01)   0.392 (0.02) 
λ  -0.327 (0.02)  -0.263 (0.03)  -0.244 (0.04)  -0.167 (0.06)  -0.007 (0.01)  -0.322 (0.03) 
WSR,T=SR,NT   0.49 [0.243]   9.51 [0.001]   9.56 [0.999]   0.74 [0.805]  0.21 [0.322]  0.04 [0.577] 
WSU,T=SU,NT 90.9 [0.000]  10.9 [0.000]  57.5 [0.000]   6.31 [0.006]  1.37 [0.121]  1.92 [0.083] 
WSO,T=SO,NT 20.7 [0.000]  16.6 [0.000]  37.1 [0.000]  45.1 [0.000]  1.19 [0.138]  0.04 [0.578] 
Standard-errors in parentheses. Estimation results for the selection equation are not reported but are 
available upon request. In the last three rows, the Wald statistic is distributed as F(r, n-r) where n is the 
number of observations and r is the number of restrictions. The ‘young’ workers group comprises of 
persons who are 35 years at most. Older workers form the ‘mature’ workers group. ). In square brackets 
are P-values of one-sided tests of coefficients where H0: q1 ≤ q2 and q=α, β, γ; i.e., the parameters in (4). 
Source: ABS 1997 Education and Training Unit Record File. 
 


























Figure 1. Skill Mismatch, Training and Aging
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